Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
Dear Mr. Koizumi,
I am writing to ask you, as the Prime Minister of a country that was bombed by atomic weapons, to create a breakthrough at the forthcoming Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
As you are no doubt well aware, there is a sense of crisis surrounding this conference. The crisis stems from well-founded beliefs that (1) the nuclear weapons states have not lived up to their commitment under Article 6 of the NPT to "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards nuclear disarmament, and (2) Article 2 of the NPT is under increasing pressure, in that nuclear weapons have already spread to some states not defined as nuclear weapons states under the NPT and could easily spread to several more in the near future. It has reached a point where some people are questioning the future of the NPT. There is an urgent need to inject new life into the NPT.
You are the Prime Minister of a country with a special responsibility in regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This year is the sixtieth anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You are the Prime Minister of the country that suffered that tragedy and which abjures nuclear weapons. As such, you are in a position to give leadership for true nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons and, in so doing, to inject new life into the NPT. Japan will then truly be able to occupy the honored place in international society referred to in the Preface to the Constitution.
In the absence of an international consensus for a new stronger treaty, the NPT remains the best hope for containing the spread of nuclear weapons and eliminating those which already exist. However, most assessments are pessimistic about the possibilities of a positive outcome from next month's conference. I believe the principle reason for this pessimism is that a number of key countries have adopted a very inflexible attitude towards their own narrowly defined 'national interest'. These countries are stubbornly pursuing pet projects, which they deem to be essential to their 'national interest', but which, when viewed in a broader context, actually undermine global security and, in so doing, undermine their own security.
I would like to draw your attention to one particular example, which is in your power to influence. I am referring to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. As you know, the purpose of this plant is to extract the plutonium generated at Japan's nuclear power plants, by reprocessing their spent nuclear fuel. This December it is scheduled to commence active tests using spent fuel. In this regard, I note that over the last few months there have been several appeals for a moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle projects. These appeals represent a recognition of the unavoidable proliferation risks associated with nuclear fuel cycle activities. Of all the facilities at Rokkasho, the facilities for uranium enrichment and for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel are particularly problematic. However, the Japanese government has indicated that it will not support a moratorium. Is this not an example of the inflexible attitude towards narrowly defined 'national interest' mentioned above? I urge you to reconsider your position.
Support from the Japanese government for a moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle projects would inject new life into the NPT process. Flexibility on behalf of the Japanese government would induce other countries to show flexibility. It would be the breakthrough that the world is hoping for. Given the stakes involved, the benefits of being flexible on this issue far outweigh any imagined benefits from proceeding with the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is arguably the most significant of all the new nuclear fuel cycle projects in the world today. Its significance lies in the following four areas:
1. The size and complexity of the plant make it technically impossible to maintain complete control of all the nuclear materials. It will extract approximately 8 tons of plutonium, enough for 1,000 nuclear weapons per year. Furthermore, 50kg of plutonium could go missing each year during reprocessing without being detected. This is enough to make 6 Nagasaki-style bombs;
2. Japan currently possesses 40 tons of plutonium. This is excess plutonium. The reason for this is that, because of the Monju accident, there are no prospects of the fast breeder reactor program becoming a reality. The idea of burning plutonium in light water reactors in the form of MOX fuel fails to solve the problem from a quantitative point of view. Furthermore, the local citizens have opposed this idea for safety reasons. Inevitably people will suspect that this plutonium will be used to make nuclear weapons;
3. Starting up Rokkasho will open the flood gates to other states which might wish to develop nuclear fuel cycle projects. It won't do to say that Japan is an exception. By starting up Rokkasho, the way will be opened up for further nuclear proliferation;
4. Over the past 50 years human beings have tried to tame nuclear power for civilian use. The time has come to accept that a peaceful and sustainable society cannot coexist with nuclear energy. Nuclear energy cannot be controlled safely. Accidents, injuries and other problems continue to occur at Japan's nuclear power plants. There is still no accepted means of dealing with the radioactive waste that they produce. The nuclear fuel cycle is even more difficult to control than regular nuclear power plants.
Other countries look at Japan with resentment in regard to Rokkasho. They perceive another layer of discrimination. The distinction between nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states that was written into the NPT inevitably bred resentment and fueled the desire among some non nuclear weapons states to develop their own nuclear weapons. Rokkasho creates another level of discrimination: between those non nuclear weapons states which may and those which may not develop nuclear fuel cycle projects.
The abovementioned moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle projects could act as a deterrent to other countries wishing to make or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. I wonder whether those governments which are stubbornly determined to pursue their own nuclear fuel cycle projects realize just how dangerous this is.
On the other hand, if the Japanese government were to accept a moratorium on the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, this would send a powerful message to the world. The message that Japan needs to send the world is that now is not a time for stubborn pursuit of narrowly conceived 'national interest'. Now is a time for nations to show flexibility and to commit themselves to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Next month's NPT Review Conference in New York will be a wonderful opportunity to discuss the future of humanity.
For the realization of world peace, the choice that Japan is now facing is far more important than Rokkasho. I appeal to you to announce an indefinite moratorium on the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
Yours sincerely,
Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
