{"id":3661,"date":"2017-02-02T13:07:40","date_gmt":"2017-02-02T04:07:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.cnic.jp\/english\/?p=3661"},"modified":"2017-02-02T13:07:40","modified_gmt":"2017-02-02T04:07:40","slug":"the-post-311-three-eleven-anti-nuke-movement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/?p=3661","title":{"rendered":"The Post 3\/11 (\u201cthree-eleven\u201d) Anti-Nuke Movement"},"content":{"rendered":"
What was<\/em> that nuclear accident?<\/strong>
\nThe investigation into the nuclear accident is continuing at a snail\u2019s pace. This is because it is still impossible to get a clear understanding of just what the accident entailed.<\/div>\n
There have been countless incomprehensible moves surrounding the accident, and while a large number of issues remain unresolved, only the obliteration of memory moves forward. Smothering over errors is tantamount to the abandoning of a determination of the causes of the accident and the pursuit of liability, and because of this there is a lack of opportunity for self-reflection, which is likely to be the reason why the same errors are repeated over again. If so, this in itself can be said to be another error. In this sense, the expression the \u201cerosion of memory\u201d is not necessarily correct, and there are doubts that anything such as \u201cunderstanding\u201d worthy of erosion existed in the first place.<\/div>\n
One example would be the explosion that occurred in Unit 4 during the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS), in spite of it being shut down for regular inspections. The reasons given for this are absolutely incomprehensible. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) \u201cestimates\u201d that the explosion occurred \u201cbecause vent gasses, including hydrogen, associated with a vent of the Unit 3 containment vessel, flowed into Unit 4 through an exhaust pipe,\u201d (\u201cWhy did a hydrogen explosion occur in Unit 4?\u201d TEPCO website) but this cannot be readily accepted. There are many other issues that need to be investigated, such as the tangled information regarding the \u201cexplosion\u201d in Unit 2, information regarding pipe ruptures before the arrival of the tsunami, and whether or not, in the first place, the operations to bring the emergency at FDNPS to an end were carried out in accordance with the procedure manuals.
\nNeglect of these facts seems to have created an atmosphere where horrifying claims such as \u201cIt cannot be proven that shut down nuclear reactors are safer than those in operation\u201d are allowed to become widespread, albeit on the net.<\/div>\n
The investigation of errors gets put on the backburner when people are up to their eyebrows in issues that appear without limit from one day to the next. That is why unearthing of the true causes and problems of the nuclear accident is not carried out and liability becomes ambiguous, leaving countermeasures to fall behind, ending up with the current reality of permitting nuclear restarts. As plainly indicated by the example of Monju, which was operated without any decommissioning technology being available, it has now become the norm to \u201cthink while running\u201d even with issues that pose serious risks to people\u2019s life and health.
\nIsn\u2019t it just at this time that we should be pausing for thought, and finding it necessary to engage in self-reflection and investigation of the errors? If we did so, as the investigation of the accident progressed, the difficulties of getting at the truth of the causes would probably become more apparent, and if that happened, it should be impossible to do anything like permit facile restarts of nuclear power plants.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
3\/11 as a Big Bang<\/strong>
\nOne of the important pillars of the nuclear accident investigation is verification of the damage and suffering involved. The complexity of the damage has been emphasized, and that trend is deepening even today. However, if the realities are untangled one by one, the actual situation is not really all that complex. The haphazard handling of the situation in the wake of the nuclear accident has contributed to the confusion, but if we look back and consider the origins of the incident, the essential matters come into view. With the accident\u2019s first instant as the point of departure, problems spread, people moved around, and it became difficult to see what was happening. Disorganized and inconsistent handling of the accident occurred repeatedly. These became the causes for the inconsistent conclusions that were drawn.<\/div>\n
Therefore, in the investigation of the damage and suffering caused by the nuclear accident, if we liken the first instant of the accident to a \u201cbig bang,\u201d the complexity can be overcome by probing into what occurred after that in chronological order.<\/div>\n
In contrast, if we peer at the situation from the stated premises of \u201cthe evacuation zones determined by the government\u201d or the various \u201csafety standards,\u201d and so on, the problems (here, the \u201cdamage\u201d) become obscured, and it would be necessary to add the processes by which these responses were made to the list of items for investigation.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
What the \u201cthree-hour blank\u201d brought about<\/strong>
\nThe tsunami arrived at FDNPS at around 50 minutes after the earthquake struck at 14:46 on March 11 2011. (There are several views about the precise time of the arrival of the tsunami.) At around 15:37 to 15:41, all AC power was lost to Units 1, 3, and 2 in that order. This caused TEPCO to issue, at 15:42, an \u201cArticle 10 notification\u201d to the government based on Article 10 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (hereafter, \u201cAct on Special Measures\u201d). Following that, it was judged that the power station was now experiencing a station blackout (SBO \u2013 loss of all power) when, at 16:36, DC power (from batteries) was lost in Units 1 and 2, and thus TEPCO issued, at 16:45, an \u201cArticle 15 notification\u201d to the government (based on Article 15 of the Act on Special Measures). This signified the occurrence of a severe accident.<\/div>\n
Strangely, in March 2016 (around the same time that the manual on the assessment of a meltdown was \u201cdiscovered\u201d), it was \u201cfound\u201d that the batteries had been submerged when the tsunami arrived, and thus the DC power had also been lost at the time when all the AC power was lost. We can therefore see that, by rights, the Article 15 notification should have been issued at that point (around 15:40). A delay of around one hour occurred at the stage of the report by TEPCO to the government.<\/div>\n
It is stipulated in the Act on Special Measures (Article 15, paragraph 2) that the Prime Minister, upon receiving an Article 15 notification, must \u201cimmediately\u201d announce a Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation (hereafter, \u201cDeclaration\u201d). Furthermore, it is also stipulated that the Prime Minister should take such action as issue instructions on evacuation and indoor sheltering to the mayors or governors of the relevant municipalities and prefectures.<\/div>\n
In fact, however, the Declaration was announced at sometime after 19:00, more than two hours after the Article 15 notification had been received. Why was that?<\/div>\n
Since the main membership of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters had been prescribed in advance by law (Act on Special Measures, Article 17), it was not because there was a delay in selecting the members. In addition, since the actual Declaration made no mention of \u201czones where emergency response measures should be implemented,\u201d it was not that the delay was caused by determination of the scope within which emergency response measures were to be implemented. So, what was the hesitation in the delay of the announcement all about?
\nNaturally, since everyone was rushing about responding to the earthquake and tsunami, one possible explanation is that there was simply no time to issue the Declaration. However, with just that eventuality in mind, the Act on Special Measures calls for an \u201cautomatic\u201d response that allows no margin for rumination.<\/div>\n
Even today, the reason for the delay has not been made clear. What we know is that in the process of announcing the Declaration TEPCO and the government brought about delays of one hour and two hours, respectively. The \u201cunlawful handling of the nuclear power plant accident\u201d began as a continuation from this point onwards.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
\u201cDerailment\u201d due to double standard<\/strong>
\nIn contrast to the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, a general law, the Act on Special Measures is a special law that takes the stance of the precautionary principle by containing provisions that handle some matters in advance if there is a \u201cprobability\u201d of the occurrence of a nuclear accident. The reason is that taking measures after an accident occurs would make it impossible to protect the livelihoods, lives and health of local residents. The \u201cautomatic implementation\u201d of the Declaration is adopted for just that reason, but this crucial measure was not carried out according to the rules.<\/div>\n
Once \u201cderailment\u201d begins, the next derailment occurs in the cover-up and justification of the first. The Declaration that was announced carries no specification of the announcing body, nor the time of announcement (which is an anomaly for an administrative document), and is written as if it had been automatically announced on receipt of the notification of the station blackout at \u201c16:36.\u201d This chain of derailments was later not limited to cover-ups and falsification of information, but induced a simultaneous, but contradictory, double handling of the situation.<\/div>\n
Already on the day of the earthquake disaster, March 11, evacuation buses were arranged in Ohkuma Town by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), and this was communicated to the General Affairs Department at Ohkuma Town Office sometime after 20:00 that day. At the chief cabinet secretary\u2019s press conference, begun at 19:42, however, it was stated that \u201cAt the present time, there is no confirmation of impacts outside the facility due to radioactive materials. Thus, it is not necessary for residents and others present inside the relevant zones to take any immediate special action now. Please stand by in your homes or in your current location and act according to latest information from the administrative disaster prevention wireless, television, radio and so on, without beginning to evacuate in a hurried manner\u201d (Office of the Prime Minister website). In the evening of March 12, at Tsushima, Namie Town, it is reported that people wearing \u201cfull protective clothing and gas masks of a kind never seen before\u201d were encouraging people to evacuate by yelling out, \u201cPlease get out of here! You are in danger!\u201d (Owada, T., Kitazawa, T., (ed.) Nuclear Refugees: Shrieking Notes<\/em>, Akashi Shoten).<\/div>\n
Despite clear knowledge of a large-scale release of radioactive materials, the government issued a contradictory press release that emphasized the \u201csoundness of the nuclear reactor.\u201d A local newspaper reported that \u201cThe government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters has stated that \u2018it is unlikely that serious damage has occurred to the containment vessels\u2019\u201d (Fukushima Minpo<\/em>, March 17, 2011).<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Fudging safety standards<\/strong>
\nAt the accident site, safety standards were altered in a haphazard manner. These, however, were not changes based on laws or regulations, but literally case-by-case changes made to fit local convenience. For instance, the decontamination \u201cscreening level\u201d for residents in the affected area was raised from 13,000 cpm (counts per minute) to 100,000 cpm. Since this standard is linked to the standard for taking iodine tablets, the alteration had the effect of dramatically reducing the number of people who need to take the tablets. Relaxation of the safety standards eliminated the necessity itself of making accident responses. \u201cExperts\u201d gave their approval to this.<\/div>\n
Very early on the decision was made that when serious contamination was confirmed, the evacuation zones and those to be evacuated were not to be expanded, but the safety standards relaxed to give an underestimation. It was the people at the accident site who shouldered the risks.<\/div>\n
This is how the responses to the nuclear accident cleaved into the \u201cwindow-dressing scenario\u201d that attempted to underestimate the damage and suffering, and the dire \u201cback-room scenario\u201d at the accident site. This signified the fact that the various types of safety standards that were established before the nuclear accident to protect people\u2019s lives and health were relegated to the \u201cback-room scenario,\u201d and underestimation of the accident became the \u201cwindow-dressing scenario.\u201d<\/div>\n
The actual responses, having issued the Declaration, were such as to explain the \u201ccurrent exposure situation,\u201d and the \u201cfront\u201d and \u201cback\u201d scenarios have continued to meander in confusion to this day. In addition, in contaminated areas, 20 mSv\/y (millisievert per year) was set as the new standard for the public exposure dose limit, while in other areas it was maintained at the previous 1 mSv\/y. This double standard has also become the norm. The doubt arises as to what the pre-accident standard meant.<\/div>\n
In the midst of this confusion there arose the \u201ccustom\u201d of not keeping minutes even at meetings where important decisions were taken. This is a topic that is also continuing to this day, as everyone knows. Hide anything inconvenient; if it gets out, evade responsibility; falsify information, etc., etc. If this is the premise we are to go on, then it would be no surprise if someone said that minutes were meaningless in the first place.<\/div>\n
The derailment that began from the March 11 point of departure continued to expand in scale across all sectors. Take, for instance, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, the security-related legislation and clauses on emergency responses, the Okinawa base construction and the issue of interference in local government, and so on; it is necessary to understand these as a \u201cseries of events flowing\u201d (towards collapse) along a line extrapolated out from the original derailment.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
What was \u201ccompletely under control\u201d? (1)<\/strong>
\nLooking back in this way, what was under control was not the radioactive material or the contaminated water, and certainly not the nuclear reactors involved in the accident, but the media and information, the views of \u201cexperts,\u201d and the actions of the residents in the affected areas.<\/div>\n
Despite the \u201cemergency,\u201d large numbers of residents not evacuated from the contaminated areas were forced to continue their daily lives without any panic occurring and with no ostensible opposition movement arising. One can only say that it was absolutely \u201cbrilliant.\u201d
\nWhat probably made this rare feat possible was the daily exercise of \u201crisk management.\u201d In the context of media control, for example, under the regional electric power monopoly (which granted ten privately-owned regional power companies a monopoly on power supply in each region), which was in place from 1931 until last year (2016), we can discern the reason why the power companies shouldered huge advertising costs to continually bombard the public with unnecessary commercials. It was \u201cinsurance\u201d against just such a crisis as we have now. This \u201cmedia countermeasure cost\u201d was also included in the \u201coverall costs\u201d as one of the items passed on to the power users, but with this mechanism being set up in 1931, advertising on this basis has a long history.<\/div>\n
More importantly, many Japanese people swallowed whole the information given out by the government and \u201cexperts\u201d without any doubts. This is also a blessing ensuing from long years of \u201ceducation.\u201d In studying for entrance exams, conducted on the principle that for each question there is only one correct answer, what you end up with is people who think that \u201cin a crisis, we are assisted by the correct and uniform information that the government provides.\u201d There is also a long history of various forms of favored treatment for the research carried out by \u201cexperts.\u201d<\/div>\n
In contrast, social pressure not to cause a panic probably generates a normality bias. Indeed, the \u201csafety declaration\u201d issued by the administration was precisely the \u201cwords we want to hear,\u201d \u201cthe required response\u201d for the local residents that wanted to believe it. In this sense, also, these psy chological mechanisms were nothing more than a normality bias.<\/div>\n
At the time of a tsunami or other such event, this normality bias will magnify the damage and suffering by suppressing the sense of crisis, but for the stratum that wishes to control people\u2019s behavior, it is desirable that the people are \u201crational\u201d human beings who act with \u201ccomposure.\u201d The fact that elementary schoolchildren were made to sit in a\u00a0 schoolyard for a headcount in the face of an oncoming tsunami (2) is symbolic of this kind of society.\u00a0 The fable of Chumon no Ooi Ryoriten (The Restaurant of Many Orders)<\/a><\/em> was written by Kenji Miyazawa a century ago, but contains warnings about this kind of social atmosphere that are valid even now.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
The Anti-nuke movement<\/strong>
\nAt first glance, the administration\u2019s and media\u2019s responses \u2013 the window-dressing responses mentioned above \u2013 that began with the 3\/11 \u201cderailment\u201d appear to have been abrupt phenomena brought about by the occurrence of a huge and unprecedented accident. As we have seen above, however, isn\u2019t it more likely that they were the \u201cprefabricated\u201d responses to an accident that was waiting to happen? In other words, it was perhaps true to say that the two kinds of responses were already built into the preparations themselves.
\nThe larger the accident, the greater will be the responsibility associated with it. In the case of nuclear power, therefore, there would have been the necessity to create a mechanism for \u201cevading responsibility\u201d in order not to expose errors in national policy.<\/div>\n
At the time of an investigation of a nuclear accident, the actual knowledge of and an inquest on the process of preparation of these kinds of responses (which are, unfortunately, the \u201cwindow-dressing responses\u201d) is essential. Although it doesn\u2019t bear thinking about, without knowing how the \u201cresponses\u201d that sacrificed the residents of the affected areas and exposed their lives and health to critical risks, the ultimate significance of the nuclear accident may never become clear. This is the way the author (Arakida) perceives the situation now, at the beginning of 2017.<\/div>\n
3\/11 brought us the end of \u201ca society which protects local residents at the time of an accident.\u201d It was already nothing more than a \u201cpublic position\u201d anyway, but this abandonment of society became clearly apparent in the attitude of those in power. Thus, the manifestation of the \u201cbig bang\u201d was perhaps the opening of Pandora\u2019s box. The author\u2019s conclusion is that the \u201cthree-hour blank\u201d was the time it took to make the decision to turn the rudder in that direction. I have said earlier that the notion of \u201cnot protecting local residents at the time of an accident\u201d is not simply an issue of the nuclear accident and local residents. The proof of this is amply illustrated by the example of the sole application of the provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution being brought to the brink of death by the security-related legislation, symbolized by the clauses on emergency responses. Thus, the issue of the nuclear accident was not simply an issue of the nuclear accident alone.<\/div>\n
At present, with the true intentions and undisguised violence of power holders taking society by storm, this is not the time for a restoration of the \u201cpublic position.\u201d<\/div>\n
The nuclear phase out\/anti-nuke movement has been accorded new meaning after 311: The regeneration of the world we live in. I believe that from now on it will be necessary to conduct our activities with our eyes on the horizon of the \u201cbuilding of a new world\u201d beyond the issues of nuclear restarts and local consent.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
<Takeru Arakida, Associate Professor, Faculty of Administration and Social Scientists, Fukushima University><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
\n
Endnotes<\/strong>
\n(\u00a01) Prime Minister Abe used the phrase “completely under control,” (referring to Fukushima Daiichi) in his address to the International Olympic Committee in September 2013 when urging them to select Tokyo for the 2020 Olympics.<\/div>\n
(2) This refers to Okawa Elementary School in Miyagi Prefecture, where 74 children and 10 staff lost their lives, failing to evacuate the school before the tsunami engulfed them.<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What was that nuclear accident? The investigation into the nuclear accident is continuing at a snail\u2019s pace. This is because it is still impossible to get a clear understanding of just what the accident...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3661","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-fukushima"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3661","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3661"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3661\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3665,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3661\/revisions\/3665"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3661"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3661"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3661"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}