{"id":4522,"date":"2019-08-02T17:40:45","date_gmt":"2019-08-02T08:40:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.cnic.jp\/english\/?p=4522"},"modified":"2019-08-05T17:26:26","modified_gmt":"2019-08-05T08:26:26","slug":"considering-the-form-of-a-nuclear-free-society","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/?p=4522","title":{"rendered":"Imagining a nuclear-free society"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Report on the 100<\/em>th<\/em><\/sup> Public Seminar of the Citizens\u2019 Nuclear Information Centre <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Kataoka Ryohei<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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CNIC\u2019s 100th<\/sup> Public Seminar was held on June 23, 2019 at the Korean YMCA in Japan Asia Youth Center. Going nuke-free can already be called inevitable, but how should Japan\u2019s bureaucracy, which has existed for nearly a century and half since the Meiji era, be reformed? Also, what would a truly affluent sustainable society be like? We had Shindo Muneyuki (professor emeritus, Chiba University) and Teruoka Itsuko (professor emeritus, Saitama University) give us their ideas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Prof. Shindo Muneyuki<\/strong>: \u2018A Nuclear-free society and political-governmental structural reform\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is a \u2018nuclear-free society?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In\ndirect terms, a \u201cnuclear-free society\u201d is one from which nuclear power and the\ntechnological and economic systems associated with it have disappeared.\nHowever, even though Japan became thoroughly acquainted with the consequences\nof war in its 1945 defeat, it says it will go ahead again and purchase an\naircraft carrier and F-35 fighter jets. Even if all of its nuclear power plants\nwere to be shut down, that would not result in a nuclear-free society. For\nexample, it might still produce technological and military systems for space\nwarfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even\nassuming the nuclear power plants disappeared, our way of thinking as a social\nsystem would probably remain the same. A nuclear-powered society is a metaphor\nfor faith in megatechnics and modernization. A nuclear-free society would be\nthe polar opposite of that, switching from megatechnics to appropriate\ntechnology and producing a social framework with an economic society and\nlifestyle in which human activity is valued. But this is quite a difficult\ntask.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A\nsociety that regards appropriate technology and human dignity as important\ncannot be explained without mentioning how it would confront the problems of\npolitical democracy. At the heart of modern political administrations is the\nstructure known as bureaucracy. How to reform a bureaucracy for a nuclear-free\nsociety is an important theme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bureaucracy as the best-matched system for modernization<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It has been in the modern age that the organizational form known as bureaucracy has become a problem. German sociologist Max Weber said that bureaucracy as a type of governance constitutes the most rational-legal way in which human activity can be organized. It excels at rational-legal governance in that it makes the actions of authorities predictable to outsiders on the basis of various social criteria such as laws. However, it organizes systems of authority and responsibility into a pyramid form with impersonal constituent members. Because of this impersonality, it works extremely mechanically and efficiently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japan\u2019s bureaucracy and politics<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nJapan, a cabinet government system was established in 1885, replacing the \u201cDajokan<\/em>\n(Grand Council of State)\u201d system that had been established earlier in the Meiji\nera, and in the latter half of the 1880s, a bureaucratic structure was created.\nThis bureaucratic structure, however, was not a part of the national\ngovernment. It was created to serve the Emperor under imperial sovereignty. A\nvariety of aspects of this system came to light in the 70 years of its duration\nbefore and after the war. This bureaucracy had the following three essential\ncharacteristics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ethos (mentality) of putting officials first <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under\nthe pre-war imperial government, it was said that the citizens were subjects of\nthe Emperor and called sekishi<\/em> (literally, \u201cbabies\u201d), while the\nofficials were the Emperor\u2019s servants, thus their interests came first. The\nofficials performed their work by borrowing authority from the Emperor, who was\nthe sovereign. The people could not intervene. Even now, if Japan\u2019s\ngovernmental organizations make any kind of error, they never talk about\nresponsibility for it. Officials are infallible so the people must be at fault.\nThis is the ethos of official infallibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Status issues of the bureaucracy or legal public official system<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\npre-war bureaucracy was divided into three categories: high-level officials,\ncommon officials and subordinate officials, or \u201cemployees.\u201d In addition, status\nrelationships were systematized in accordance with distance from the Emperor.\nThe term for the subordinate officials, \u201czoku<\/em>,\u201d was derived from \u201cfuzoku<\/em>\n(accessories),\u201d a demeaning term. When the current Public Officials Law was\nenacted in 1947, this status system was abolished. The employment examination\nfor civil servants, however, categorizes those taking it on the assumption of\ntheir potential for advancement. Six years ago, the National Public Service\nExamination was divided into comprehensive and general-duties courses. The\nformer had been known long before as the \u201celite course,\u201d and the latter course\nhas limited possibilities, providing no chance of advancing beyond section\nchief in a local bureau regardless of efforts. The status relationship that\nexisted in the pre-war bureaucratic system continues essentially as before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unclear authority and responsibilities of governmental organizations <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u3000The legislation establishing each of the ministries, including\nthe cabinet ordinances and ministry ordinances based on them, lists the scope\nof affairs under the jurisdiction of each ministry, bureau and section. Almost\nall are written as \u201caffairs regarding XX,\u201d which is easy to understand in any\ncase. However, regarding the ministers, vice-ministers, bureau directors,\nsection chiefs and other positions, nothing is written about their\nresponsibilities or authority. Those are left unclear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another problem is the relationship between the\nadministrative function laws and the National Government Organization Act. The\nadministrative function laws provide the basic criteria for the exercise of\npublic authority. In the case of violating the speed limit under the Road\nTraffic Act, for example, the criterion for exercising authority is an\n\u201cadministrative function law.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The National Government Organization Act governs the\nestablishment and scope of affairs under the jurisdiction of governmental\norganizations. By nature, there is supposed to be an anaphoric relationship\nbetween the National Government Organization Act and the administrative\nfunction laws, with the latter referring back to the former, but under the\nimperial government there was no need for that. Even after the war, though, the\nrelationship between them was left unexamined. Therefore, these days it is\nstill possible for officials to exercise authority on the basis of nothing more\nthan the National Government Organization Act\u2019s regulations on the scope of affairs\nunder their jurisdiction. This way of running affairs gives government agencies\nunlimited authority. If there are no legal standards for exercising authority\nand authority can be exercised on the basis of regulations on the scope of\naffairs under the jurisdiction of governmental organizations alone, authority\nexpands without limit. This is why Japan\u2019s bureaucracy has amplified its\nauthority beyond comparison with those of other advanced countries. This kind\nof abuse is also seen in nuclear power policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u2018<\/strong>Kantei\u2019<\/strong><\/em> Leadership System and Bureaucracy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

From\nthe late 1980s to the early 1990s, one political scandal after another came to\nlight in Japan. In response to that, a single-seat constituency system was\nintroduced to the House of Representatives as a political reform. In addition,\nthe Parties Subsidies Act was passed for distributing subsidies in accordance\nwith the number of Diet members each political party had. Under the system\nimplemented by this and other legislation, the central authority within\npolitical parties has become stronger. That political reform persists to this\nday, with the prime minister becoming more powerful. Furthermore, under the Abe\nadministration, the Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office have hypertrophied\nto the extent that Prime Minister Abe has created a veritable mini-Kasumigaseki\n(the district in Tokyo where most of Japan\u2019s government ministry offices are\nlocated) of his own. This has resulted in coining of the terms \u201cKantei<\/em> leadership\u201d\nand \u201cKantei<\/em> bureaucracy,\u201d Kantei<\/em> being the Prime Minister\u2019s\nresidence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What should be reformed in what way\u2014in line with bureaucracy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\noffer the following in answer to the question of what should be done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n