{"id":4634,"date":"2019-10-07T16:05:54","date_gmt":"2019-10-07T07:05:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.cnic.jp\/english\/?p=4634"},"modified":"2019-10-08T10:58:50","modified_gmt":"2019-10-08T01:58:50","slug":"japans-plutonium-stockpile-data-for-2018","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/?p=4634","title":{"rendered":"Japan\u2019s Plutonium Stockpile Data for 2018"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

by Ban Hideyuki (CNIC Co Director)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2018 official report on\nJapan\u2019s stockpile of extracted plutonium revealed that the amount of such\nplutonium stored at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (JNFL) Rokkasho Reprocessing\nPlant showed no changes, while the plutonium stored at the Japan Atomic Energy\nAgency (JAEA) Tokai Reprocessing Plant declined after plutonium oxide was\ndelivered to the fuel processing facility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Naturally, the amount of\nplutonium oxide stored in the fuel processing facility increased, but no fuel\nprocessing has been conducted there to date. Since it has already been decided to\nshut down the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, there will be no opportunity for fuel\nprocessing to be performed at the facility in the future. The amount of\nplutonium nitrate stored at the Tokai plant showed no change. The amount has\nremained the same during the past 16 years, which means that no plutonium fuel processing\nhas been conducted in the facility. Such a long-term storage of plutonium is inappropriate,\nsince problems such as container corrosion may occur. Thus there is a need for\nthe plant operator to reach an agreement with the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)\non how to proceed with the work as soon as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The amount of yet-to-be\nirradiated plutonium stored in practical power reactors shrank by 1,524 kg.\nAccording to the report, this reduction was caused by irradiation of the\nplutonium that was loaded into the reactors (the amount of plutonium loaded\ninto the reactors plus that of irradiated plutonium in the year 2018). This\nmove can be confirmed in Fig. 1: Breakdown\nof Separated Plutonium Stored at Nuclear Facilities<\/em>. In the table, the 2018\ndata are shown in parenthesis. The amount of irradiated plutonium at Unit 3 of\nTakahama NPP in Fukui Prefecture totaled 181 kg, that of Unit 4 at the same\nplant was 703 kg, and that of Unit 3 of Genkai NPP in Saga Prefecture was 640 kg.\nThis means that plutonium was loaded into the nuclear reactors at the two\nabove-mentioned nuclear power plants before pluthermal energy generation was\nconducted there, and that the unused plutonium remains in the reactors as nuclear\nfuel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In 2011, Unit 3 of Fukushima\nDaiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) experienced a partial melt-through of the\nnuclear fuel after the plant was struck by the Great East Japan Earthquake and the\ntsunami that followed. In the table, however, the amount of loaded plutonium is\ncounted as though it had not been irradiated and remained intact inside the\nreactor. This may be because it is now virtually impossible to assess the amount\nirradiated, and therefore there is no choice but to calculate the amount of plutonium\nas though it were the same level as the pre-accident period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In March 2001, 28 assemblies of MOX\nfuel were delivered to the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in Niigata\nfor use in Unit 3. But local residents rejected pluthermal energy generation in\na local referendum in May 2005. In addition, it was disclosed in August 2002 that\nTEPCO had falsified data in its own inspections, concealing problems in 29\ncases. As a result, the plant operator was forced to abandon the plan to load\nthe MOX fuel into Unit 3, and the nuclear fuel is therefore still stored in the\nwater pool in the facility. In May 2009, 28 assemblies of MOX fuel were also\ndelivered to the Hamaoka NPP in Shizuoka Prefecture for use in Unit 3. The 2011\nnuclear accident at FDNPS, however, forced the plant operator to suspend\nloading of the nuclear fuel into the reactor. In the case of the Ikata Nuclear\nPower Station in Ehime Prefecture, 21 assemblies for use in Unit 3 were transported\nby the same ship that delivered the assemblies to Hamaoka NPP, and part of the\nnuclear fuel was loaded into the reactor. Nevertheless, no pluthermal\ngeneration was conducted at the plant before the end of 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where is the useless plutonium\ngoing?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

JAEA terminated operation of its\nFugen Experimental Advanced Thermal Reactor (ATR) in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture,\nin 2003 and is now taking procedures for decommissioning the reactor. The\ncompany earlier signed a contract with French state-owned Orano reprocessing\nplant in La Hague to transport 731 assemblies of used fuel from the Fugen reactor\nto France. The used nuclear fuel is to be reprocessed in the country and the\nplutonium, uranium, and nuclear waste extracted in the process are to be\nreturned to Japan at some point in the future. The plutonium, in particular,\nshould be transported to Japan under strict protection after it is reprocessed\ninto nuclear fuel. This means the costs of transportation and reprocessing are\nlikely to become greater than usual, since the amount of extracted plutonium is\nrelatively small, around several tons. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, which company would\nundertake pluthermal energy generation? It seems that all electric power\ncompanies in Japan are struggling to work out schemes to consume the plutonium\nstock on hand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was a plan to use the\nplutonium in the\nAdvanced Sodium Technological\nReactor for Industrial Demonstration (ASTRID) project in France. It is\nuncertain what the future of the project will be after the work to formulate its\nconcept design is completed. Indications are that France may also shelve this\nproject, saying that there is no need to develop the reactor in a hurry. The\nuseless plutonium may be stored in France for a long time, which will force\nJapan to pay large storage costs. The Monju problem may follow suit after the\nFugen problem. Japan\u2019s policy to reprocess all the plutonium from nuclear power\ngeneration is to be blamed. This foolish policy should be abandoned and\nreplaced by a new policy to store spent nuclear fuel as-is within Japanese\nterritory. While doing so, we must work hard to develop new methods for processing\nand disposal of the spent fuel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Release of data on Japan’s plutonium stockpile began at the end of 1993. On January 3, 1993, powder-type plutonium weighing 1.5 tons was returned from France to Japan for use as MOX fuel in Monju. At that time, the countries potentially on the route of the shipment and other related organizations launched strong opposition to this shipment. They also voiced concerns on Japan\u2019s use of plutonium. To dispel these concerns, Japan decided to publish data on its plutonium stockpile. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, the policy to\ntransport plutonium was reviewed from the viewpoint of the physical protection\nof nuclear materials. Japan announced that, from that time on, it would ship\nthe plutonium in the form of MOX fuel. This indicated that the separated\nplutonium could be used for the MOX project alone. (Since Monju is a\ndomestically-developed reactor, it was impossible for its operator to have the\nnuclear fuel produced overseas.) In 1997, the Federation of Electric Power\nCompanies announced its plan to conduct pluthermal generation in 16 to 18\nreactors in Japan. They have yet to change the number of the reactors even now,\nbut the current situation shows that it is hardly possible to predict when such\na plan will be realized.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by Ban Hideyuki (CNIC Co Director) The 2018 official report on Japan\u2019s stockpile of extracted plutonium revealed that the amount of such plutonium stored at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (JNFL) Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4634","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-data","category-plutoniumdata"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4634","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4634"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4634\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4647,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4634\/revisions\/4647"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4634"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4634"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cnic.jp\/english\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4634"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}