Two years have passed since the outbreak of
the disastrous nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station (FDNPS). Even now, about 3,000 workers are engaged in various
operations in the plant every day. Without the hard work of the workers
and their struggles with the fear of accumulating radiation exposure in
the plant’s extremely severe condition, it would be impossible to
achieve an end to the accident.
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Table 1. Accumulated External and Internal Dose
of Workers Engaged in Radiation-related Operations at Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station. Accumulated Dose Distribution at the End of
December (March 11, 2011 to December 31, 2012)
Notes: 1) Values for external exposure use the sum of the APD values
for each area entered, but these can vary due to replacement by monthly
dose values from cumulative dosimeters. 2) Significant internal
exposure is not recognized after October 2011. This table was prepared
from data published by TEPCO to which total exposure data has been
added. (CNIC)
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Table 1 is based on data for the
evaluation of plant worker exposure to radiation published by Tokyo
Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) on January 31, 2013 and shows cumulative
internal and external exposure up to the end of December, 2012. Total
accumulated exposure has reached approximately 300 person-Sv, an
enormous amount. Of this, roughly 70% is accounted for by cumulative
exposure of workers hired by subcontractors. In March 2011, the TEPCO
officials who took charge of the work to deal with the accident
suffered overwhelmingly large exposure to radiation. But in and after
April 2011, the total accumulated exposure of the workers employed by
subcontractors exceeded the levels of the TEPCO officials.
According to TEPCO’s report on the
overall situation regarding accumulated radiation exposure levels of
the workers at FDNPS released on December 3, 2012, the levels are on
the decline due to the overall situation at the plant. The report noted
that the radiation levels of the majority of the workers were far below
the exposure limit, and that they are still able to take part in
radiation-related operations. The report thus indicates that TEPCO is
extremely optimistic about the workers’ accumulated exposure levels.
The number of workers whose one-month
radiation exposure topped 10 mSv totaled 20 in October 2012 (the
highest was 16.94 mSv), 15 in November (19.28 mSv), and 8 in December
(15.85 mSv). According to data compiled in FY2009, before the nuclear
accident occurred, the annual radiation exposure levels of 94% of the
workers were 5 mSv or less, with the highest level standing at 19.5
mSv, and the average exposure level at 1.1 mSv. Considering these wide
gaps, it is evident that the workers are currently working in a far
more severe environment at the nuclear power plant than previously. The
electric utility should realize the fact that the workers are exposed
to incomparably large amounts of radiation compared with the
pre-accident period.
Although two years have passed since
the accident occurred on March 11, 2011, it has been disclosed recently
that TEPCO has yet to submit to the Radiation Effects Association
(REA), a public interest incorporated association that manages
radiation exposure data of workers at nuclear power plants across the
nation, data on more than 20,000 workers that have worked at the
Fukushima plant since the nuclear accident (TEPCO announced on March 25
that it had submitted the data for FY2011 and FY2012).
In Japan, nuclear plant workers are
working under a multi-layered subcontractor system with the electric
power companies at the top. Some of them are engaged in work involving
regular inspections of nuclear power plants, moving from one plant to
another. Unless their exposure data are collected and managed by one
organization, their cumulative exposure levels may sometimes exceed the
legal limit. These cumulative exposure levels are collected and managed
in a database by the Radiation Dose Registration Center (RADREC). This
is the private-sector system for registration and management of
radiation exposure doses financed mainly by electric power companies.
Under this system, the original
contractor or subcontractor records data in the worker’s personal
“radiation work passport” (in most cases, this passport is managed by
the subcontractor), and electric power companies send the data to the
REA Central Registration Center. This means that Japan’s system for the
management of radiation-related worker exposure data is fragile and not
legally binding.
Wages and compensation for
workers with above-limit exposure to radiation under the subcontractor
system.
Since July 2012, when it was discovered that worker
exposure to radiation was being concealed by covering the personal
dosimeter with a lead plate, TEPCO conducted a questionnaire survey
with the workers, and the government ministries concerned, such as the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), also carried out various
types of investigations on the management of worker exposure.
The MHLW report, titled “Results of
the Investigation on the Management of Worker Exposure at the TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi NPP,” was released on October 30, 2012. The report
stated that the first-tier and the lower-tier subcontractors discuss
the future with plant workers when their cumulative exposure levels
approach the limit set by the original contractor, and in most cases
are taking the following measures.
In the case of general contractors,
the workers whose cumulative exposure levels approach the limit will be
transferred to the low-exposure-level workshop in the plant. When the
workers’ exposure level exceeds the limit despite the transfer, they
will be assigned to other general construction work or decontamination
work. (Such workers are sometimes forced to switch jobs.) In the case
of the subcontractors engaged solely in work at nuclear power plants,
it is difficult to find other jobs for such workers outside the plant.
The subcontractors have therefore set up a rotation system for their
workers among the company’s branches so that the exposure levels of all
the workers are almost evened out. Should the worker exposure level
approach the limit, the workers will be transferred to jobs carried out
in a low-dosage environment in the plant or to decontamination jobs.
These measures can be taken only by
the first-tier and other high-tier subcontractors that are to some
extent providing their workers with a guarantee of status. The
lower-tier subcontractors are unable to transfer their workers to other
workshops and the workers will lose their jobs if their exposure levels
exceed the limit. There is also another problem of intermediary
exploitation of their wages.
In a series of investigations
conducted so far, it was disclosed that there are many labor brokers
disguised as subcontractors, and the mass media have begun reporting on
these questionable people. In view of this situation, it is necessary
to abolish this multi-layered subcontractor system, and provide the
plant workers with guaranteed wages. There is also a need to establish
a system to secure jobs for workers with above-limit exposure levels
and guarantee them social security. The government must tackle this
problem immediately, as it is expected that the workers will be
required to work in even more severe environments during the coming
decades until the nuclear power plant is decommissioned. This has been
a major problem since nuclear power plants first began operation, and
our society as a whole must face this problem and cope with it in a
conscientious manner.
Cutting corners in
decontamination operations and sloppy management of worker exposure
data. Decontamination workers have filed a complaint with the
government over the pocketing of special allowances by employers.
The decontamination projects launched for
restoration of disaster-hit areas by the central and local governments
are creating "new exposed work". In the pilot decontamination project
carried out in 2011 in the evacuation zone and the planned evacuation
zone, one of the workers was exposed to a total of 11.6 mSv over the
108-day period. It was reported that this worker’s accumulated
radiation exposure would reach 129 mSv, far greater than the official
limit of 100 mSv, if he continued to do the same job for five years.
The most serious aspect of this problem is that neither the
decontamination workers nor the residents engaged in decontamination
work in their communities on a voluntary basis are fully aware of this
risk.
It was also revealed that cutting
corners is rampant in decontamination operations. One example is that
contaminated water from decontamination works is not collected and is
simply drained off into the environment. Although the Ministry of the
Environment (MOE) has been informed, it is very slow to respond to such
problems, and its competence as the ministry in charge of a national
project to which a massive budget is allocated is in doubt.
The government and MOE are paying a
10,000-yen per day special job allowance in addition to wages to
decontamination workers in consideration of the radiation exposure
risk. However, the reality is that the workers are not receiving the
allowance. MOE is handing out the contracts for decontamination
operations to general contractors, but there are a number of
subcontractors under each general contractor. Among the subcontractors
are temporary job placement agencies, construction companies, civil
engineering and building contractors, painting companies, and other
local medium- and small-sized businesses. They form a complex,
multi-layered subcontractor system.
Our organization, the
Radiation-exposed Workers' Solidarity Network has received more than
100 complaints and inquiries from decontamination workers. “I received
the allowance, but instead they reduced my wages to the lowest level,”
“Although the employer is required to provide me with accommodation and
food costs, they deducted those costs from my wages retroactively,”
“The employer didn’t prepare masks for workers. So I had to buy one for
myself. The company doesn’t measure personal dosimetry and I don’t know
how much radiation I have absorbed so far,” are some of the examples of
their complaints. Their comments have revealed that the subcontractors
are not taking proper measures to reduce their worker exposure risks,
that they have unilaterally reduced the workers’ wages or changed their
working conditions, and that they are attempting to conceal the fact
that they are pocketing the special allowances.
Since last year, the Fukushima
Solidarity Union, Iwaki Free Labor Union and other groups participating
in the Radiation-exposed Workers' Solidarity Network have been helping
decontamination workers through joint negotiations with a number of
subcontractors. Confronted with strong indignation expressed by the
workers, the subcontractors have apparently come to the conclusion that
they could no longer conceal their misconduct, and begun admitting that
they had pocketed the special allowances. Meanwhile it has also been
revealed that the second-tier and third-tier subcontractors have not
been paid sufficient sums of money from the original contractor to pay
the special allowances to their workers. This means that the
lower-level subcontractors were also victims.
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Workers negotiating with the government
concerning problems with the decontamination operations (Feb. 28, 2013)
Photo by Akira Imai.
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On February 28, the Radiation-exposed
Workers' Solidarity Network and its affiliated groups negotiated with
MOE and MHLW about the problems appearing in decontamination projects.
Many workers took part in the negotiations and complained of various
issues that have arisen in decontamination operations. They demanded
thorough investigations regarding the multi-layered system, from the
original contractors down to the subcontractors, and called for
ministerial guidance vis-à-vis the contractors. “I really want to know
who has pocketed the special risk allowance paid by taxpayers’ money,”
said one of the workers. A MOE official replied, “It is not so
important to know who has pocketed the allowance, but whether the
allowance was paid to each worker or not.” He went on to say that the
ministry is checking the workers’ wage ledgers. The workers were not
convinced by his reply and retorted angrily. “The workers’ wage ledgers
do not tell the truth. The reality is that we haven’t received
anything, even an employment contract,” “You have left everything to
general contractors and that’s why you cannot discover the truth,” said
the workers. The MHLW official said the ministry will launch an
investigation if the workers consult the local labor bureaus about the
matter, or if they give information about their problem to the bureau.
The workers replied angrily that the labor bureau did not take up their
problems and did nothing for them. Another worker also complained that
he went to an MHLW office and told the official there about the unpaid
risk allowance, but the official urged him to continue negotiations
with his employer and eventually did nothing. The issue of the
management of decontamination worker cumulative exposure and other
problems were not taken up and remain pending.
As for management of decontamination
worker cumulative exposure to radiation, REA is charged with creation
of the database, just as in the case of the nuclear plant worker
exposure data. But the truth is that REA has yet to receive any data on
decontamination worker radiation exposure. MOE drew up a contract form
to be used when signing with general contractors for decontamination
projects, and clearly stipulated in the contract that each worker must
obtain a radiation work passport whenever possible. REA called on MOE
to urge the subcontractors to send exposure data for each worker to REA
when each decontamination job is completed so that the organization can
manage the data for all the workers in a uniform manner. MOE said it
would comply with the request. REA says, however, that it has not
received any such data yet. The Radiation-exposed Workers' Solidarity
Network plans to clarify who is responsible for the management of the
worker exposure data in future negotiations with the government, and
will strive to resolve the problem.
Mikiko Watanabe (CNIC)
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