It has been decided that the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), the
national research institute that operates the Monju prototype
fast-breeder reactor in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, will be ordered to
rebuild its maintenance and safety management systems. This order was
issued by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) following the agency’s
failure to conduct nearly 10,000 inspections on reactor devices and
equipment and sloppy measures taken by JAEA after the failure came to
light.
This order prohibits JAEA from engaging in preparatory
work, such as reloading the nuclear fuel, to resume reactor operations.
Inspections for ensuring safety of the reactor are excluded from this
order. The order will be effective until the agency revises its
maintenance and management systems, and the regulator verifies the
agency’s reports on the improvements. The harsh order was issued in
response to the agency’s skipping of inspections, changing inspection
intervals without taking proper procedures, and their failure to take
appropriate measures even after this sloppy management was made public.
JAEA President, Atsuyuki Suzuki expressed his intention to step down on
the day when the order was issued. He can hardly escape the charge that
he hastily resigned to dodge possible severe condemnation from the
public.
The report JAEA submitted to the NRA on January 31,
2013 said its analysis on the fundamental cause of these questionable
practices was carried out in accordance with the “systematic procedures
of human-error analysis developed by the great Tokyo Electric Power Co.
based on human-factor technology for the purpose of effectively
analyzing accidents and other problems.”
However, this analysis, described in such pompous
and vainglorious language, did not make any mention of JAEA’s (1) lax
management, (2) insufficient checking functions, (3) inadequate efforts
to improve its safety management program, (4) lack of communication
between the management and front-line workers, (5) weak corporate
safety culture, and other problems. This indicates that the analysis
reveals nothing of importance and is therefore worthless.
The JAEA leadership came to know about the skipped
inspections after the regulator pointed out the irregularities. The
report revealed that JAEA failed to carry out a full-fledged analysis
into the cause of such slipshod practices. NRA member Kunihiko
Shimazaki sharply criticized JAEA, saying that the agency had attempted
to make a short-term fix by compiling a report full of empty jargon,
and the fact that such a questionable organization is allowed to exist
is a problem in itself. His remarks seem to have hit the nail on the
head.
JAEA has thus far carried out seven analyses into
fundamental causes of accidents and problems that have occurred at its
facilities. The first was conducted following the 1995 leaking of
sodium coolant during the trial operation of Monju, causing a fire.
Other cases include trouble involving a sodium leakage detector, and a
2010 accident in which a fuel exchanger fell into the reactor. (See
Nuke Info Tokyo
126,
134,
138,
139)
JAEA nevertheless continued to make similar,
off-the-point comments in its reports on these accidents. Why is it
that the agency repeats this inexcusable practice again and again? This
question should have also been included among the targets of its
fundamental-cause analysis. The agency has been putting inspections of
equipment under the charge of the manufacturers and also entrusting
dealers with the work of managing inspections. It has been revealed
that the intervals between inspections were managed and recorded
manually by officials of the sections concerned, and that the unified,
computerized management was not carried out. These facts, however, had
already been brought to light in previously published analysis reports,
and yet JAEA did nothing to improve the situation. What a disorganized,
slipshod organization JAEA is!
In the JAEA Tsuruga office that controls the Monju
project, the officials charged with the development of the project
during the 18 years since Monju has been shut down due to the sodium
coolant leakage accident have already retired and few people have full
knowledge of the whole system. Moreover, the representatives of the
suppliers of parts and equipment have also been replaced by the younger
generation. Monju has not operated for any length of time since the
1995 sodium coolant leakage accident and fire. With the passage of
time, the outlook for commercialization of the fast-breeder reactor is
receding into the distance, and we can now consider that it has
effectively disappeared.
To date, one trillion yen has been spent on the
Monju project and an additional 55 million yen is being spent on
maintenance each day. Which one of the JAEA staff in charge of taking
care of the facilities of the stalled Monju reactor believes that the
reactor will experience trouble-free operation after being restarted?
The indications are that Monju is becoming old and
antiquated while lying idle, rather similar to JAEA’s Tsuruga office.
(Hideyuki Ban, Co-director of CNIC)
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