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100t highly contaminated water leaked at Fukushima Daiichi
Around 23:25 on February 19, 2014, a worker on patrol found
highly contaminated water leaking from a storage tank on the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) premises. 100 tons of
concentrated saline water overflowed from the upper part of the tank.
The concentration of beta-emitter nuclides in the water was about 240
megabecquerels per liter (MBq/l) and radioactive cesium about 11,500
Bq/l. The leak spilled directly onto the soil outside the embankments
by way of rainwater guttering. According to TEPCO, the plan had been to
transfer the contaminated water to a different tank, but it was
directed to this tank by mistake. There were three acceptance valves
in the piping to the tank. Around 0:30 on February 20, two of the three
valves that were in the open state were closed, and the rainwater
guttering end was covered with plastic bags in order not to allow the
contaminated water to leak outside the embankments. As of February 28,
about 42 tons of contaminated water had been collected with a vacuum
car, and about 100 m3 of contaminated soil had been dug up and
collected.
At first the mistaken water transfer was attributed to the failure of
the valve that was closed. However, it had actually been opened by
someone. It was closed again by someone after the leak occurred. The
valves to the tank to which the contaminated water should have been
sent had also been opened and closed. It is not known who operated the
valves, whether the opening and closing of the valves were mistakes
that were later covered up, or whether the actions were intentional.
The three valves to the tank that leaked the water were controlled in
order to keep them closed. The closure of these valves was not included
on the patrol checklist, and this omission was questioned. On February
24, it was revealed at a Nuclear Regulation Authority gathering that in
April 2013 TEPCO had instructed that the two valves be kept open for
operational efficiency. At 14:01 on February 19, an alarm sounded
indicating an excessively high water level. Workers assumed, however,
that the alarm had malfunctioned and did not make a visual check of the
water level from the top panel of the tank onsite or check the tank
water level data that must have been transmitted to the water treatment
control room.
This incident once again highlights TEPCO’s poor problem management
performance. The company urgently prepared an alarm response manual
that was introduced on a provisional basis on February 21.
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Citizens file for compensation against the suppliers of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors
On
January 30, 2014, the Class Action Against the Nuclear Reactor Builders
(CAANRB), established in August 2013, filed a lawsuit against General
Electric, Toshiba and Hitachi, the suppliers of TEPCO's FDNPS nuclear
reactors, at the Tokyo District Court. They claim compensation for
emotional distress. All six FDNPS nuclear reactors were boiling-water
reactors (BWR), and the prime contractors were GE for Unit 1 (460 MW);
GE-Toshiba for Unit 2 (784 MW) and Unit 6 (1,100 MW); Toshiba for Unit
3 (784 MW) and Unit 5 (784 MW); and Hitachi for Unit 4 (784 MW).
The plaintiff team includes 1,058 individuals from Japan, and 357 from
32 other countries. More plaintiffs are expected to join in the second
lawsuit. The Japanese Nuclear Energy Damage Compensation Law limits the
responsibilities for damages related to nuclear power stations to
electric power companies, exempting manufacturers. The lawsuit is an
attempt to disconfirm this exemption.
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Mitsubishi Heavy Industries establishes new Turkey Nuclear IPP Development Department
On
February 1, 2014, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) established a new
in-house Turkey Nuclear IPP Development Department to reinforce its
involvement in the Sinop nuclear power plant (NPP) project planned for
the Republic of Turkey. The new department is directly controlled by
the company’s Energy & Environment domain headed by Senior
Executive Vice President Atsushi Maekawa.
The Sinop NPP project is an independent power producer (IPP) project
for the construction and operation of four nuclear power reactors in
the Sinop area of Turkey’s Black Sea coast (see page 6). In October
2013, the Turkish government signed a commercial agreement called a
host government agreement (HGA) with the international consortium
proceeding with the project, thereby reaching agreement on an overall
framework. The project is expected to employ the ATMEA1 model reactor,
a next-generation nuclear power reactor developed by ATMEA, a joint
venture of the French company Areva and MHI. The ATMEA1 is a 1,100 MW
pressurized-water reactor (PWR).
The new department will perform tasks including feasibility studies,
negotiations concerning various contract agreements, the preparation of
a funding scheme, and the planning for localization and technology
transfer.
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Japan–Turkey Nuclear Agreement Questioned
The governments of the Republic of Turkey and Japan
signed a nuclear agreement in April 2013 on Japan’s side and in May on
Turkey’s side. On January 14, 2014, the Japanese government presented
the agreement to the House of Representatives for approval. However,
voices opposing the agreement are rising from other countries as well
as from the two countries concerned. In November 2013 and February
2014, NGOs in Japan submitted a list of names of groups and individuals
who endorsed a statement opposing the agreement to the chairpersons of
the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, and other
relevant people. A total of 142 groups and 3,270 individuals (including
1,805 from overseas) endorsed the statement.
Voices of opposition to or concern over the agreement
have been raised not only from opposition party diet members but also
from those of the ruling parties. The reason why the agreement is
controversial is that, compared with Japan’s nuclear agreements with
other countries, the agreement with Turkey is weak with respect to
nuclear nonproliferation. If this agreement is officially approved,
other countries may demand changes to incorporate similar wording.
For example, in the agreements with Jordan and Viet Nam,
“technology for and equipment for uranium enrichment, spent nuclear
fuel reprocessing, conversion of plutonium and production of material
and plutonium shall not be transferred under this Agreement .” In the
agreement with Turkey, however, the part preventing proliferation
reads: “. . . may be transferred under this Agreement only when this
Agreement is amended for that purpose in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 14.” The agreement with Jordan states that “nuclear material
transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material recovered
or produced as a by-product shall not be enriched or reprocessed within
the jurisdiction of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan .” The agreement
with Viet Nam, which does not entirely ban nuclear proliferation,
states: “. . . shall not be enriched or reprocessed within the
jurisdiction of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, unless the Parties
otherwise agree.” However, the corresponding section in the agreement
with Turkey reads: “. . . may be enriched or reprocessed within the
jurisdiction of the Republic of Turkey, only if the Parties agree in
writing.” The Japanese government has made the excuse that
proliferation is not possible without the agreement of Japan, but the
nonproliferation clauses in the agreement with Turkey sound more
positive about nuclear proliferation. (related issue 1, 2)
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Revisions to Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund Law and Electric Utility Industry Law Presented to the Diet
The
Japanese government has decided to revise the Nuclear Damage Liability
Facilitation Fund Act to reorganize the Nuclear Damage Liability
Facilitation Fund in order to enable it to perform decommissioning
activities. The government also decided to revise the Electric Utility
Industry Act to enable total liberalization of electric power
retailing. After cabinet approval, the government presented the two
revised bills to the House of Representatives on February 28, 2014. The
government aims to have the bills enacted during the current
ordinary session of the Diet.
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Temporary power loss at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 spent fuel pool
On
February 25, a subterranean power cable was damaged during earthworks
near Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 building,
disrupting power supply. The cooling system for the Unit 4 spent fuel
pool was halted for 4 hours and 30 minutes until power supply was
restored using another cable. The pool water temperature increase due
to the power loss was estimated to be less than 1ºC.
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