|
TEPCO
drained contaminated water out of the barriers surrounding water tanks
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, failing to follow
standardized procedure
Contaminated-water tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station are divided into groups, each group being surrounded by a
barrier to prevent contaminated water from overflowing in case of tank
leakages. Rainwater that accumulates inside the barriers is drained
after being checked for contamination. On September 16, 2013, when a
typhoon was approaching the plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company
(TEPCO), the owner of the plant, was concerned that the rainwater might
flood over the barriers due to heavy rain and drained the water that
had accumulated inside the barriers at seven positions as an emergency
measure. The rainwater, contaminated with radioactivity, was drained to
the ocean by way of the drain ditch, and TEPCO was exposed to strong
criticism as a result.
Accordingly, TEPCO requested a working group of Japan’s Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA) to establish a standardized procedure for
the drainage of water accumulated within the barriers. On October 15,
the working group decided to settle the request immediately because
another typhoon was approaching the crippled nuclear power plant, and
approved the water drainage procedure that had been presented by TEPCO,
with some procedural steps replaced with stricter ones. On the next
day, however, TEPCO neglected to follow the standardized procedure by
draining water at nine positions along the barriers after measuring
radioactivity concentration only onsite and finding that the
contamination was below the maximum acceptable level for drainage,
although the water was supposed to be measured after being transferred
to a tank used exclusively for this purpose, as stated in the
procedure. At two positions water was contaminated in excess of the
acceptable level and urgently transferred to an unused underground
reservoir because other underground reservoirs were leaking.
Without responding to criticism from the NRA and the Fukushima
prefectural government, TEPCO failed to take measures during the
following days when it did not rain, and kept the nearly overflowing
rainwater as it was. On the 20th, there was heavy rain in the area,
resulting in water flooding over the barriers at eleven positions. At
five positions out of the eleven, and at one position where water was
nearly overflowing, TEPCO drained water without following the
standardized procedure. Flood water from two positions was transferred
to an underground reservoir. The flood water included Strontium 90 at a
level higher than the acceptable level for drainage out of the
barriers, and water at four positions out of the eleven included
Strontium 90 at a level higher than the legally established acceptable
level for drainage out of the facilities. On the 24th, to be prepared
for the next typhoon, TEPCO started to transfer water inside the
barriers into even the underground reservoirs that were leaking and no
longer used.
|
|
Japan speeding up the planned export of nuclear power plants to Turkey
On
October 29, 2013, the international consortium in which Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries participates (along with Japanese company Itochu and
French company GDF Suez), agreed with the government of the Republic of
Turkey on the outline of the commercial contract concerning the Sinop
nuclear power plant project, which the Turkish government is promoting.
On the same day, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed this agreement and signed a
joint declaration of cooperation between Japan and Turkey in the fields
of nuclear energy and technology.
The Sinop Nuclear Power Plant project calls for the construction of
four nuclear power reactors in the Sinop area near the Black Sea. This
commercial contract, called a Host Government Agreement, specifies the
range of cooperation and the framework of a feasibility study to
implement the project. It is scheduled to be officially signed between
the consortium and the Turkish Government after approval by the
national assembly of Turkey. Details on such issues as the financial
framework and electric power sales agreement will be decided in future
negotiations.
On October 25, immediately before Japan and Turkey
signed the agreement, the Japan–Turkey nuclear cooperation agreement
signed in May was submitted to Japan’s House of Representatives for
approval, along with the Japan–UAE Agreement, which was also signed in
May.
|
|
Removal of spent fuel from Unit 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station started
On
October 30, 2013, Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority approved Tokyo
Electric Power Company’s plan to transfer fuel from the spent fuel pool
of the Unit 4 building of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to a
common pool in another building. TEPCO started to remove the fuel on
November 18. According to the plan, the transfer of all the fuel in the
pool is scheduled to be completed at the end of 2014.
|
|
Inauguration of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and Mutsu Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facilities postponed
The
inauguration of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant (Rokkasho Village,
Aomori Prefecture), owned by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, and the Mutsu
interim spent fuel storage facilities (Mutsu City, Aomori Prefecture),
owned by Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company, was scheduled for October
2013 but was postponed. On October 29, 2013, the two companies
explained the postponement to the Aomori prefectural government and
assembly. The notice for Rokkasho preprocessing plant was submitted to
Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) on November 1, 2013. That of
the Mutsu interim spent fuel storage facilities was submitted to NRA on
November 5. The establishment of new regulations for these facilities
by the NRA is expected in December, but according to the owners, since
it is unknown how long it might take to investigate whether or not the
two facilities satisfy the requirements of the standards, their future
schedule is unknown.
|
|
Japan signs the joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons for the first time
At
the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, on October
21, a joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons,
signed by 125 countries, was announced. The Japanese government
formerly refused to sign it because signing it would not be consistent
with the fact that the nation is under the nuclear umbrella, but became
a party to the joint statement for the first time, judging that the
phrase contained in the statement that “all approaches and efforts
toward nuclear disarmament” would be compatible with the the retention
of a nuclear deterrent. The government has been strongly criticized by
a large number of people for not having signed the statement,
especially by atomic bomb survivors, and had little option but to
change its stance and sign this time.
|
|
First
comprehensive nuclear disaster drill exercise since the Fukushima
disaster organized at Sendai Nuclear Power Plant, Kagoshima
On October 11 and 12, 2013, the first comprehensive nuclear disaster
drill exercise was organized by the national government since the
Fukushima disaster. The exercise simulated a full-scale emergency
condition at the Sendai nuclear plant, owned by Kyushu Electric Power
and situated in Satsumasendai, Kagoshima Prefecture. Roughly 2,500
officials from about 130 organizations participated in the exercise,
along with 750 local residents (including 178 Satsumasendai locals). On
day 1, those who reside in the five-kilometer precautionary action zone
(PAZ) and need support at the time of a disaster evacuated, and on day
2 all residents in the PAZ and a part of the population living in the
30-kilometer urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) evacuated. It
was stressed that this exercise was different from past exercises
before the Fukushima disaster in that participants were not informed of
what would unfold during the exercise and would be trained about how to
assess and deal with the situation. However, because the exercise
simulated the real-time development of the disaster, idle time occurred
frequently; many participants were observed to be smoking outdoors
while an emergency meeting was supposed to be in progress.
While the air dose was supposed to be about 400 times as high as a
normal dose, local residents participated in everyday clothes. Some
waited for an evacuation bus at the designated bus stop, which was, of
course, outdoors. “I was told to be here at two o’clock,” said a local
resident, who appeared to be participating in the exercise according to
a prearranged schedule.
Generally, this exercise remained the same as past exercises in that it
belittled internal exposure and lacked a sense of emergency.
|
Return to NIT 157 contents
Return to CNIC News
Service
|
|