Fukushima Now (28) – Will Radioactive Contaminated Soil be Distributed Nationwide?
By Yamaguchi Yukio
This month marks 14 years since the Fukushima nuclear accident. It was so severe it put Japan under a “nuclear emergency declaration” that is still in effect. Peaceful daily lives have not returned to those who were affected by the disaster and had to evacuate. There are about 25,000 such evacuees living away from their homes (as of Nov. 2024, about 5,700 living in Fukushima Prefecture and about 20,000 beyond).
How do we deal with radioactive matter? This is a very difficult question. Antoine Henri Becquerel in France discovered the phenomenon of radioactivity in 1896, and nearly 130 years have passed since then, during which scientists have been elucidating the realm of the atom. One thing we understand is that radioactivity diminishes over time, in accordance with its half-life, and there is nothing we can do about that but wait it out. Finding ways to protect life and the environment from radioactivity during that time is crucial. One fundamental principle is not to spread radioactive materials but manage them centrally.
This month also marks 10 years since the project was launched to collect radioactive contaminated soil and sand and take it to the interim storage facilities in Fukushima Prefecture. An enormous volume of contaminated soil, some 14 million cubic meters, hauled in by 2.06 million dump truck runs as of December 2024, is being held in a vast storage area of 1,600 ha spanning Futaba and Okuma towns. By law, it is supposed to be transported out of Fukushima Prefecture by March 2045. There are plans to reuse contaminated soil below a certain level of radioactivity.
On 7 February, the Ministry of the Environment revealed four proposals for final disposal methods for the contaminated soil. They are 1) not reduce the volume, 2) screen the soil, 3) screen and heat-treat the soil and 4) screen and heat-treat the soil, followed by fly-ash cleaning treatment. The amount of radioactivity per kilogram would come to 10s of thousands of becquerels (Bq) for 1) and 2), 100s of thousands of Bq for 3) and 10s of millions of Bq for 4). The amount going into final disposal and the area required for the disposal site would decrease accordingly. For example, in the case of 1), about 2.1 to 3.1 million cubic meters would take up about 30 to 50 ha; while in the case of 4) about 50,000 to 100,000 cubic meters would take up about 2 to 3 ha.
It would be a mistake to use contaminated soil, even below certain levels of radioactivity, in roads, levees, farmland or the like for “disposal of decontaminated soil” on the basis of a law created in a panic to cope with an unprecedented accident. Worse, this scheme being called “reconstruction recycling.” What we need is “centralized management of radioactive materials.”
We are about to make the mistake here of applying double standards between 100 Bq/kg and 8,000 Bq/kg.
The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Raw Materials, Nuclear Fuel Materials and Nuclear Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act), which came into force in 1957, stipulates a clearance level (under which waste does not have to be treated as radioactive) for waste emerging from nuclear power facilities of 100 Bq/kg. On the other hand, under the Act on Special Measures for Decontamination (abbreviated here from a very long official name), which was passed in August 2011, radioactive material considered “accident-derived” has a clearance level of 8,000 Bq/kg. Both criteria refer to radioactive cesium. Neither of them sorts it out by the strength of its radioactivity. This does not make sense.
Workers engaged in the collection, transportation, storage, classification and disposal of the removed soil are unable to avoid external exposure. Serious levels of internal exposure occur at sites where microparticles of soil dust are suspended in association with activities like construction. Nearby residents and anyone passing through those construction sites are also subject to internal exposure to radiation.
Whenever an accident or natural disaster occurs, there is concern about unexpected conditions arising. This also brings to mind cases such as the collapse of a road into a sinkhole at a major suburban intersection in Saitama Prefecture just north of Tokyo in late January.
No one knows how long it will take to complete the cleanup work from the Fukushima nuclear accident, but it is feared that it will be more than a century. During all those years, workers engaged in the effort will continue to be exposed to radiation. After the accident, a male subcontractor who had been engaged in cleanup work was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia, which was certified as a work injury. According to reports, it was the first time for the responsibility of a primary contractor in the management of radiation-exposed labor to be recognized—a rare instance of good news.
The policy of Japan’s government to make full use of nuclear power plants, giving the go-ahead for reconstruction of old ones and the building of new ones, and allowing them to operate beyond 60 years must be called a betrayal. They are pretending as if the Fukushima nuclear accident never occurred. It boggles the mind.
(March 1, 2025)
