In Celebration of the 600th issue of CNIC Newsletter “Tsushin” – Social Watchdog and Vox Populi; Realities of the 14th Year after the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and Roles of the CNIC Newsletter “Tsushin”

By Hasegawa Koichi (Professor Emeritus of Environmental Sociology, Tohoku University)

Realities of the 14th year after the Fukushima nuclear disaster

Congratulations on the 600th issue of the CNIC Newsletter Tsushin!

In 2000 Dr. Takagi Jinzaburo, who was expecting his own death in the near future, published his essay “To Friends — The Last Message from Takagi Jinzaburo,”¹⁾ in which he wrote: “What we cannot be optimistic about is that the age of nuclear power is terminally ill and an enormous nuclear disaster or illegal misbehavior may strike the nuclear industrial world. Thinking of this last single year, which has experienced the JCO accident and the Russian nuclear-powered submarine disaster, the risk of a catastrophe caused by the age of nuclear power under terminal conditions and the possibility of an uncontrollable release of nuclear waste are the greatest concerns that worry this person who is about to pass away ahead of others.” Just as Dr. Takagi had feared, the TEPCO Fukushima nuclear disaster occurred, the operator has begun to release ALPS-treated contaminated water to the ocean, and contaminated soil resulting from decontamination work is being reused.

Following the Fukushima disaster, Germany pronounced its policy to break with nuclear power generation. On April 15, 2023, the final three reactors were closed down, thus shutting down all the reactors in the country. The “final day of nuclear power,” which Dr. Takagi had wished to see, was realized in Germany. However in Japan, as if to ignore the voices of the victims of the Fukushima disaster, the Kishida cabinet has switched its nuclear policy to make the maximum use of nuclear power plants, and is explicitly strengthening the policy of promoting nuclear power generation. As can be seen in the document, “Conditions Surrounding Energy,”²⁾ drawn up by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in the process of formulating the Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, various shifts on the international and domestic scene, such as the necessity of measures against climate change, the invasion of Ukraine, the generative AI boom, and the establishment of new data centers, are used as excuses for nuclear power promotion under the fishy-sounding made-in-Japan English coinage “GX” (“Green Transformation”).

A total of 12 reactors have restarted in Japan since the Fukushima nuclear disaster, followed by the establishment of a new regulation framework with the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) at its apex. As of May 2024, 13 years after the disaster, however, no nuclear power plant (NPP) in the eastern part of Japan, including Hokkaido, is in operation, and no boiling-water reactor (BWR), the same type as the crippled Fukushima reactors, has restarted. From an overall point of view, the critical voices of civil society may have prevented the restart of BWRs and all nuclear plants in eastern Japan. The completion of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, which was initially planned to start commercial operation in 1997, currently remains unknown. However, these cannot all be attributed to civil movements. Kashiwazaki–Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (NPS) Units 6 and 7 were found to be deficient in terms of protection against terrorism (by individuals or groups but not during warfare), safety measures have not been completed in Unit 7, and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, the operator of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, has been unable to make sufficient preparations to allow the NRA to perform a safety evaluation. As these events indicate, a series of “own goals” has delayed reactor restarts and the commercial operation of the reprocessing plant.

Thus, shocking events that cannot but make us question the fundamental safety of nuclear plants and facilities have become more frequent in recent years.

NPPs as a target of military attacks

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia began two years and six months ago (in February 2022) and is continuing even today. Operating or shut down nuclear facilities in Ukraine have been targeted by Russian military attacks and occupation in acts that have  shocked people around the world³⁾. The Zaporizhzhia (Zaporozhye) Nuclear Power Plant, the largest plant in Europe, consisting of six 1-GW nuclear reactors, was occupied by Russia on March 4, 2022, and is currently run by Ukraine under an agreement with Russia. The Chornobyl (Chernobyl) NPP, whose Unit 4 was involved in a severe accident in April 1986, was occupied by Russia until March 31, 2022, but has been run by Ukraine since April 1 . Many problems have occurred on NPP premises, such as fires and losses of external power supply, and these tightrope conditions, which could easily result in a nuclear catastrophe, are continuing. Even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Japanese NRA (Fuketa Toyoshi, former NRA Chairperson) stated that “measures against military attacks are not required, because military attacks resulting from bilateral conflicts are not expected.” Thus the NRA does not include risks from military and (in the context of bilateral warfare) in safety regulations. It is a new and difficult problem: what effective measures are available as preparations for military and terrorist attacks? In principle, it is virtually impossible to provide sufficient safety measures, which are at the same time  cost-raisers.

The Noto Peninsula earthquake shock

The Noto Peninsula Earthquake on the first of January this year has given the public the impression that “disasters are part of daily life.” It also made clear that evacuation plans produced to enable residents living near a nuclear power plant to evacuate when an accident occurs are nothing more than armchair discussions. The NRA Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Response, produced after the Fukushima disaster, says that when a nuclear accident occurs the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of nuclear accident preparedness, and the NRA, which developed the guide, will evacuate all residents living within five kilometers of the plant, and will determine whether residents living between five and 30 kilometers should “shelter indoors” or evacuate. However, it remains unclear what kind of response is required when a combination of a natural disaster and nuclear disaster occurs.

Fortunately, when the Noto Peninsula Earthquake occurred, the Shika Nuclear Power Station, which stands close to the seismic center, had not restarted, thereby preventing a severe accident from occurring. The vicinity of the power station, however, experienced severe damage: roads were severed due to the collapse of cliffs and land subsidence, isolating small villages and making designated evacuation roads useless. Evacuation shelters, designated as emergency shelters located at five kilometers from the nuclear plant for those whose dwellings have collapsed, had insufficient capacity. An especially notable fact that was revealed was that concrete evacuation facilities, which can block radiation, also had insufficient capacities.⁴⁾ The Ishikawa Prefecture disaster preparedness plan reportedly included instructions for complex disasters, but did not mention such conditions as wrecked roads and the unavailability of indoor shelters. The evacuation plan drawn up by Shika Town, the municipality hosting the plant, did not even mention “complex disaster.”⁵⁾ Not only the Shika Nuclear Power Station but many nuclear plants in Japan are located on peninsulas or in remote areas, surrounded by mountains, where roads are narrow. The evacuation plans drawn up by individual NPPs have been criticized as being unrealistic, and the Noto earthquake has now made it clear that those plans are simply impractical.

Private-life–centered conservatism and affirmation of present nuclear policy

Before the Fukushima disaster, a number of public polls indicated that the majority was in favor of promoting nuclear power generation. A Cabinet Office public poll showed that, after 1999, the ratio of those in favor of promotion increased: in 2009, the ratio of those in favor were 60%; those in favor of retaining the status quo, 19%; and those in favor of abolishing nuclear power generation, 16%. However, after the disaster, public polls conducted by Asahi and Yomiuri newspaper companies in May 2011 or later, indicated that the ratio of those who are in favor of having more plants declined drastically to between 1% and 5%; those in favor of retaining the status quo was between 20% and 40%; and those in favor of fewer reactors, about 70%. Public poll results retained this tendency for some time. However, at the end of 2020, during the coronavirus pandemic, the ratio of those in favor of fewer plants or abolishing nuclear power started to decrease, and the ratio of those in favor of retaining the status quo or restarting reactors increased. Anxiety about a stable energy supply due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and power bill increases due to a weak yen are said to have caused people to affirm the current status. According to Japan General Social Surveys (JGSS), led by the Osaka University of Commerce, those in favor of “immediately closing all nuclear reactors” were 13% (2018), 8% (2021), 5%, (2022) and 4% (2023); those in favor of “abolishing nuclear power generation in the long term,” 39% (2018), 36% (2021), 34% (2022) and 25% (2023). As these figures indicate, those in favor of discontinuing nuclear power generation are gradually shrinking. Those in favor of “building more nuclear reactors” were 2% (2018), 3% (2021), 3% (2022) and 7% (2023). Those in favor of “reducing the number of reactors without abolishing nuclear power totally, 23% (2018), 21% (2021), 22% (2022) and 20% (2023). What attracts attention is that the ratio of those who are in favor of “operating existing reactors without increasing the number of reactors” are gradually increasing: 23% (2018), 33% (2021), 36% (2022) and 44% (2023).⁶⁾ Survey leader Professor Iwai Noriko says that opinions that affirm the current nuclear power policy are relatively strong in the prefectures where nuclear reactors have restarted. In Hokkaido, Aomori, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Shizuoka and Shimane, which host reactors that have not yet restarted are relatively negative toward the current situation, with the exception of Miyagi.⁷⁾

The author believes that private-life–centered conservatism, which pursues safety and freedom from worries, and where people tend to protect their own lives, supported nuclear power promotion before the Fukushima disaster, and after the disaster, turned to favoring a reduction in dependence on nuclear power. However, concerns about energy supply and higher power bills changed people’s attitudes toward nuclear power, favoring reactor restarts, showing that opinions favoring the retention of the current nuclear power policy have become stronger.

In 2011 and 2012, immediately after the Fukushima disaster, the momentum of the civil movement against nuclear reactors grew, but failed to achieve significant results in national elections. Since 2013, anti-nuke rallies and gatherings have not successfully attracted as many participants as before. Recently, the issue of nuclear power is not at the top of the agenda in national elections. In addition, opposition parties have different opinions about nuclear power generation. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, the biggest opposition party, is internally divided with regard to nuclear policy.

Pro-nuke circles and anti-nuke circles have long engaged in a tug-of-war over nuclear policy, but recently, the gains of the former are generally more significant. What is especially concerning is the attitude of the judiciary toward nuclear power generation.

The Supreme Court decision of June 17, 2022 and the political return to nuclear power generation

The Supreme Court decision of June 17, 2022, which was delivered in regard to four cases demanding damage compensation from the Fukushima nuclear disaster, including bread-and-butter business restoration, acquitted the government in a manner that seemed designed to throw off the independence of the judiciary. After this decision, court decisions denying the national government’s responsibility are appearing one after another, as if following the Supreme Court decision,⁸⁾ starting from the March 10, 2023 Sendai High Court decision in the case filed by Iwaki City residents.

As can be seen in the Governmental Accident Investigation Report, National Diet Accident Investigation Report, and Private-party Accident Investigation Report, it has been indicated by researchers across the country as well as by researchers in other countries that the TEPCO Fukushima nuclear disaster was a human-made catastrophe in which the national government, having regulatory authority, bears a grave responsibility. The June 17 Supreme Court majority ruling completely ignored these reports. The decision is an extremely dangerous and unfair one, which may cause the reconstructed nuclear safety administration to become a lame duck.

The dissenting opinion by Judge Miura stated: The Long-term Assessment (Long-term Assessment of 2002 [author’s note]) did not expect the occurrence of an ultrapowerful earthquake due to the movement of multiple zones in series, as was the 2011 earthquake. However, the phrase did not expect does not justify the disregard of all predictable events. If preparations against the situations that could be deduced from the Long-term Assessment had been implemented immediately and if the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and TEPCO had reviewed the assessment in earnest, according to the legislation, proper measures could have been taken, thereby likely preventing the disaster. We must look into the real issue of this case, without paying excessive attention to the scales and other extraordinary features of the earthquake and tsunami.” This dissenting opinion is a rigorous criticism of the majority opinion.

The Supreme Court is called double-faced: it is positive in relieving victims relatively flexibly, while it follows government policy in court cases related to policy, cold-shoulders the plaintiffs, and does not approve of injunctions, such as in court cases related to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, defense, and nuclear power policy.⁹⁾ In the cases where compensation for damages resulting from the Fukushima nuclear disaster are demanded, it explicitly follows government policy. In addition, there is a structural background. The supreme court judges engaged in this case, including presiding judge Kanno Hiroyuki, and power operators have cozy ties via a major law firm, as reported in concrete detail in Changes of TEPCO by Goto Hidenori (Junposha Co., 2023, in Japanese). The independence of justice is no more than a facade.

After the Supreme Court decision of June 17, 2022, the first GX meeting was held on July 27 in the same year, and a series of nuclear power policies was quickly established. In May 2023, the GX Promotion Act and GX Decarbonization Electricity Act were passed and took effect.¹⁰⁾

Monitoring by civil society and the roles of Tsushin

Problems remain unsolved due to the high barriers protecting vested interests. Countermeasures are only cosmetic. Crisis awareness is low among policymakers. These are the structural characteristics seen commonly in many social and political problems in Japanese society, and the issue of nuclear power generation is typical of this. Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Japanese judiciary failed to sufficiently play the role of the social monitor of nuclear facilities. The hollowed-out nuclear safety regulation was in fact supported by the courts. The government policy promoting nuclear power generation was the result of a weak social monitoring mechanism, including the courts, and it is this background that caused the Fukushima nuclear disaster.¹¹⁾ History is now being repeated. The government, legislation and judiciary are currently malfunctioning, and monitoring by civil society is more important. There is no magic power for achieving a breakthrough. For nuclear power issues, there are limits to what can be achieved through the mass media and SNS. The only way is to continue to make solid efforts one after another. From the viewpoint of civil society, earnest efforts to strengthen social monitoring regarding the problems of nuclear power generation and nuclear facilities, and to communicate truths to the general public, are the only way to move forward. Until Japan reaches its final day of nuclear power, Tsushin must continue to deliver the voices of civil society. Let us, along with all of our companions sharing the same concerns, continue to support CNIC and Tsushin.

1) “To Friends — The Last Message from Takagi Jinzaburo” (in Japanese)
cnic.jp/takagi/words/tomohe.html
The CNIC website hosts “Takagi Jinzaburo’s Room” at cnic.jp/takagi/index.html.

2) “Conditions Surrounding Energy,”
www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/2024/055/055_004.pdf

3) Updates on Nuclear Plants in Ukraine (in Japanese) cnic.jp/

4) NHK Web News Story “Nuclear Disaster Evacuation Programs across the Nation — Discovery of Regional Differences”
www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240422/k10014419091000.html

5) “Nuclear Disaster Preparedness on Sand — Nuclear Disaster Preparedness is Full of Loopholes: Unsafe Evacuation Program Revealed by the Noto Peninsula Evacuation Program.” The Mainichi Newspapers Co., March 26, 2024 (mainichi.jp/articles/20240304/k00/00m/100/175000c)

6) Iwai Noriko and Shishido Kuniaki, “Impact that the Disaster of the East Japan Great Earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi NPP had on Disaster Risk Recognition and Attitude toward Nuclear Power Policy,” Japanese Sociological Review, Vol. 255, pp. 420–438, 2013. Iwai Noriko and Shishido Kuniaki, “Consciousness Gaps and Changes in Tohoku and Entire Japan — Disaster Experience, Disaster Risk Recognition, Evacuation Preparedness, Periodical Restoration Policy Review, and Nuclear Power Policy Seen in JGSS 2021–2023 Studies and Surveys in Disaster-hit Areas along the Sanriku Coast,” 2024 (prj-sustain.w.waseda.jp/newpage/data/final/E-5_Iwai%EF%BC%86Shishido_ver1.pdf).

7) “Public Polls Reviewed with Iwai Noriko,” December 25, 2022, The Hokkaido Shimbun Press
(jgss.daishodai.ac.jp/research/news/hokkaido_shimbun_interview_20221225.pdf)

8) For the problems concerning the June 17, 2022 Supreme Court decision, refer to Yoshimura Ryoichi, Teranishi Shun’ichi and Seki Reiko (ed.), No More Nuclear Public Environmental Hazards (Junposha Co., 2024).

9) Yoshimura Ryoichi, “Problems of the Supreme Court Decision,” Yoshimura Ryoichi, Teranishi Shun’ichi and Seki Reiko (ed.), No More Nuclear Public Environmental Hazards (Junposha Co., 2024, pp. 19–20).

10) For problems concerning the GX Promotion Act and GX Decarbonation Electricity Act, refer to Oshima Ken’ichi, “Supreme Court Decision and ‘Return to Nuclear’ Policy,” Yoshimura Ryoichi, Teranishi Shun’ichi and Seki Reiko (ed.), No More Nuclear Public Environmental Hazards (Junposha Co., 2024, pp. 187–205), etc.

11) For the hollowing-out of safety regulations before the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, I have discussed this in: Hasegawa Koichi, “Nuclear Power Safety Regulation and the Role of the Judiciary,” Yoshimura Ryoichi, Teranishi Shun’ichi and Seki Reiko (ed.), No More Nuclear Public Environmental Hazards (Junposha Co., 2024, pp. 161–184).