CNIC Statement: We strongly protest the restart of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6.

January 23, 2026

On the evening of January 21, Unit 6 of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (KKNPS) (ABWR, 1.356GW) in Niigata Prefecture, which had been in shutdown since March 2012, was restarted against the will of the majority of the prefecture’s residents. We strongly protest this action by TEPCO.

The “Declaration of Nuclear Emergency,” issued for the severe accident at the same TEPCO-run Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (March 2011) is still in force. The number of evacuees from the accident exceeded 20,000, and countless people have had to give up a return to their homes. Furthermore, the investigation into this accident is only halfway complete, and there is no end in sight. In 2017, the Nuclear Regulation Authority determined that Unit 6 and 7 of the KKNPS met regulatory standards yet stated that this “does not guarantee safety.”

In 2002, shocked by the gravity of TEPCO’s cover-up incident, Niigata Prefecture inaugurated a “Technical Committee on Safety Management of Nuclear Power Plants in Niigata Prefecture.” Then, following the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake, two additional committees were established in the following year: the “Subcommittee on Earthquakes, Geology and Ground” and the “Subcommittee on Equipment Soundness and Seismic Safety.” Multiple members who were critical of nuclear power were invited to participate in each subcommittee, and more careful deliberations were conducted. Hence the name “Niigata Method.”

In response to the severe accident at Fukushima Daiichi, Niigata Prefecture established the three-verification committee (on the cause of the Fukushima accident, on the impacts on health and livelihood, and on safe evacuation methods) and a verification supervisory committee to oversee them (established August 2017, chaired by Ikeuchi Satoru), to conduct deliberations on the safety of the KKNPS.

In June 2018, the Niigata gubernatorial election candidate Hamazumi Hideyo, who had been reported to be trailing, ran a full-page opinion advertisement declaring, “I will aim for a society free from nuclear power.” He also stated that “Discussions on restarts cannot begin until the three verifications process has been completed,” and “I will seek the residents’ judgement on whether to restart the plant” Governor Hanazumi was elected on this basis.

And yet, five years later, in March 2023, Governor Hanaizumi dissolved these committees even though sufficient deliberation had not been completed. It appears that he has shifted towards supporting the national policy of returning to nuclear power.

In response to this, the people of Niigata launched a prefecture-wide campaign to decide on whether or not to restart KKNPS through a public vote.  On the other hand, the governor has been conducting public hearings, closed-door meeting with mayors, and a public opinion survey as a matter of form, and then chose to seek the judgement of the prefectural assembly rather than the residents as the method of “seeking the residents’ judgement.” This is totally inexplicable behavior.

Meanwhile, TEPCO have been fueling public distrust by repeatedly causing problems such as inadequate counterterrorism measures, unauthorized use of ID cards, satellite phone malfunctions, and reactor control rod issues. Of particular note is that the cause of the August 2025 incident, in which control rods designed to control nuclear fission became stuck and could not be withdrawn, has yet to be identified.

Residents had repeatedly raised concerns about the recurring control rod issues, but TEPCO, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the NRA Secretariat merely brushed them aside. Then, on January 17, a malfunction occurred in which the control rod alarm failed to go off. It was reported that the setting had been incorrect for the past 30 years. This was followed by an incident on January 22, only one day after the restart, in which an alarm went off in the control rod drive monitoring system during a control rod withdrawal operation. Ultimately, the reactor was shut down again as the issue persisted even after replacing the electric components.

A nuclear power plant is a complex system in which partial failures can lead to unexpected major accidents. However, looking at this series of events, it is hard not to suspect that regarding the control rod issues, while piecemeal inspections have been conducted, comprehensive inspections were never performed. Has TEPCO truly established a culture of safety?

According to a simulation conducted by Niigata Prefecture on resident evacuation in the event of a severe accident, it is impossible to avoid radiation exposure. The Noto Peninsula earthquake on New Year’s Day 2024 revealed that safe evacuation is impossible in the event of a compound disaster involving natural hazards. In Niigata Prefecture, one of the major concerns for the residents is that cars can be immobilized by heavy snow. There is a plan for evacuation roads leading in six directions to be developed and constructed at government expense. However, construction has yet to begun.

Proceeding with the restart under these condition does not make any sense. Accidents cannot be predicted in advance. We oppose the restart itself, but at the very least, shouldn’t any decision on whether to restart or not come after the evacuation routes are completed? How do they view the precedent of delayed countermeasures against the anticipated massive tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and the precedent of the postponed restart of KKNPS Unit 7 due to incomplete specialized safety facilities? This decision to restart was taken far too hastily.