Participation in the Nuclear Power Subcommittee, Part 20 – Points of Contention Regarding Action Guideline Revisions and What They Leave Out

By Matsukubo Hajime

On March 31, the Nuclear Power Subcommittee held its 48^th session.

The themes of this session were the outline report on the development roadmap, which has been under discussion by the Innovative Reactor Working Group thus far, and the review of the revision points of the “Future Direction of Nuclear Power Policy and Action Guidelines” compiled in 2023.

As its policy for revising the Action Guidelines, the Secretariat has proposed to reorganize the six main thrusts of efforts heretofore (which are to make every effort to restart idled reactors, to utilize existing reactors maximally, to develop and construct next-generation innovative reactors, to accelerate back-end processes, to enhance supply chain maintenance, and to contribute toward solving common international issues). These are to become acceleration of reactor restarts, maximization of the use of existing reactors, development and installation of next-generation innovative reactors, acceleration of back-end processes, improvement of the business environment together with maintaining and strengthening supply chains, and contribution of solutions to common problems that have been neglected internationally, with the assumption of long-term utilization of nuclear power. The Secretariat also proposes to indicate the future outlook for nuclear power plant (NPP) capacity.

I raised the following points.

1. The 7^th Strategic Energy Plan indicates the Fukushima nuclear accident as the point from which Japan’s energy policy has been derived. In today’s document, on the contrary, there is almost no mention of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. This is an extremely serious issue. Recovery from that accident has been difficult. Evacuation of residents is ongoing and compensation payouts continue. In revising action policy, I strongly urge you to include “Restoration from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, recovery from damage and continuous systematic implementation of the lessons learned” as an independent main focus for efforts. The credibility of nuclear policy is not built solely on the logic of promoting this technology. The only way to have society recognize it is by continuing to face up to the reality of the accident.
2. The precondition for the use of nuclear energy should be continuous improvements in safety by business operators, but ongoing incidents such as the numerous issues that have occurred as Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) has restarted the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS and falsification of the Hamaoka NPS’s standard earthquake ground motion data continue to raise doubts about the safety culture among the operators. It is completely wrong to promote reactor restarts or talk about new NPPs if no effort is made to resolve these issues.
3. A review of the system for designation of important power-supply development sites has been proposed. The current system emphasizes the necessity of steps such as “obtaining the consent of the municipality’s mayor,” “giving consideration to the intentions of the prefectural governor,” “completing environmental impact assessments” and “holding public hearings” as specified requirements. Regarding the consistency between the current system and the actual situation, the way the question of “what should be considered” is being discussed seems to suggest a reconsideration in the direction of easing these requirements. Abbreviating the local consent-forming process to promote the development and construction of next-generation innovative reactors is apt to undermine local democratic processes.
4. “Communication with each level of citizens” is indicated as an item, but in essence, this “communication” is not a two-way dialog, but a unilateral dissemination of information to “promote understanding.” Moreover, it doesn’t even touch on the most intimately familiar problem of impact on electricity rates—recovering the costs of reactor restarts, safety measures and decommissioning through electricity rate hikes, and who is to bear the costs of new construction. In reality, the humongous costs involved are to be passed on to the paying public. There is a need to convey this point to the citizens in an easily understood manner.

Referring to the case of a new NPP in the UK, subcommittee member Asano Kenji (Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry) called for further strengthening of support, asserting that the government needed to assume the risks for NPP projects directly. He also called for consideration of limited liability under the Nuclear Compensation Act, which is currently regarded as unlimited liability.

The Secretariat noted that it had been pointed out that there was no mention of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident or how it was handled and stated that, as it is mentioned in the current guideline as a preliminary precondition, the accident will be mentioned in the revised version as well. Also, in response to subcommittee member Asano’s comments, the Secretariat replied that they would consider it together with a comment that that the replacement process needed to be accelerated.